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SOVIET UNION - EASTERN EUROPE

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Yugoslavs Fire a Salvo at Zarodov

Q In their first direct commentary on Konstantin Zarodov's hard-line article in *Pravda* on August 6, the Yugoslavs have sharply criticized Moscow and have defended the independence of Western Communist parties.

| On September 13--four days before Brezhnev implicitly endorsed Zarodov's views--*Ljubljana Delo* published an editorial that contrasted the harsh Zarodov line with the pragmatic political activities of West European Communists. The editorial says that Moscow, having tried unsuccessfully to dominate the Yugoslav and Chinese revolutions, is attempting now to force the Communist parties of Western Europe to comply with Soviet ideological guidelines and foreign policy.

| *Delo* strongly supported the Italian Communists for ignoring foreign (read, Soviet) "limitations" and working within the framework of parliamentary democracy. It condemned the Portuguese Communists for acceding to Moscow's advice and trying to "drive all other possible competitors from the scene." The article specifically rebutted the charge of "Menshevism"--opportunism and abandoning of the party's primary role as the "vanguard" of the working class--that Zarodov leveled at Western advocates of new roads to socialism. The political situation in each country, it said, logically leads each Communist Party to confirm its own interests, "quite often in opposition to those interests which are determined by Soviet policy."

Q The author of the article is an editor of *Delo's* illustrated weekly magazine who served for several years as *Delo's* correspondent in Moscow. [redacted]

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Czechoslovakia: Problems with the Press

The recent release of Miroslav Moc as editor in chief of the party daily, *Rude Pravo*, may presage a tougher ideological tone in Czechoslovak media.

Moc's replacement is Oldrich Svestka, the party's media overlord and a veteran hard liner. Moc is listed as being "entrusted with the direction" of the paper, rather than as chief editor, and may be serving in an interim capacity. He can nevertheless be expected to crack the ideological whip, and there seems little doubt that *Rude Pravo* will even more closely reflect the view from the Kremlin.

Moc's removal coincides with increasing evidence that the party leadership is dissatisfied with the mass media. In the August 27 edition of the party weekly, *Tvorba*, for instance, the head of the party's propaganda and agitation department, Vasil Bejda, complained of "numerous problems and shortcomings still found in the activity of many mass information media." His indictment of stereotyped journalism with "mere enumeration and description without an editorial board's critical and creative approach" was clearly aimed at the media leadership.

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Hungary: Concern Over
Western Criticism of CSCE

Hungarian concern over the Western media's allegedly negative view of the Helsinki accord is becoming more evident, according to the US embassy in Budapest.

The foreign editor of the party daily, writing last weekend, lamented that the Communist countries were being "blamed" for pushing detente, just as they had previously been censured for cold war tensions. He said that detente is being held responsible for problems that are in reality the result of the West's own internal contradictions. The Communist countries will continue to seek detente and cooperation, the author said, but added that Helsinki does not commit the socialist camp to renounce its ideological goals.

A more detailed commentary in the trade union daily on the same day contains a similar mix of defensiveness and aggressiveness. The author calls the Helsinki accord a compromise that reflects the interests of both sides, but adds that it does not oblige the Communist countries to abandon their system, ideology, or solidarity with Western Communist parties. He assails the notion that the burden for implementing the CSCE principles falls on the Communist side. In a series of detailed accusations against the West, he alleges that--unlike the USSR--no US or British paper has published the full text of the Helsinki accord; that the USSR publishes more US books and shows more US films than is the case in reverse; that the US issues certain visas on the basis of political considerations; and that Radio Free Europe and Radio Liberty have increased attacks on socialism since the Helsinki summit.

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
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The embassy says it has also heard informal expressions of concern over Western negativism from Hungarian media leaders and believes they are fueled by fears that Hungarian and Soviet conservative elements will conclude that their own positions are being strengthened.



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Explosion on Tito's Travel Route in Zagreb

An explosion blew out windows of a major bank in Zagreb Wednesday afternoon. The bank is located about a hundred yards from a route used by President Tito the same day.

The US consulate in Zagreb learned of the explosion from an eyewitness who said the noise deafened him for several hours. Consulate officers who checked the bank observed that all the windows were blown outward. The consulate reported that there is a possibility that a gas main had accidentally exploded, but that the failure of the local press to report the incident is suspicious. Yugoslav police are now interrogating all bank employees.

Yugoslav emigre-terrorists have for a long time reportedly been looking for an opportunity to strike against Tito while he visited Croatia. Yugoslav security precautions, however, are very tight, and the emigres may have settled for a demonstration of their ability to carry out an act inside Yugoslavia that would attract the attention of the large international gathering at the Trade Fair. Yugoslav media silence on the incident is probably designed to deny them wider publicity.

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